April 6, 2007

Cryptozoological Nomenclature

The Minnesota Iceman. Copyright Loren Coleman 1969.

French cryptozoologist Michel Raynal has passed along an interesting, but perhaps challenging to cryptozoologists, paper that has been published in Zootaxa 1409: 1–22 (2007), entitled: “Does nomenclatural availability of nomina of new species or subspecies require the deposition of vouchers in collections?”

The following is the paper’s “Abstract”:

Several species of birds and primates recently described opened a debate in the zoological community on the possibility of naming new species or subspecies without material onomatophores (“name-bearing types”) deposited in collections. The current writing of the Code is ambiguous in this respect. We support here the view that such practice is not doing a service to the discipline of taxonomy as illustrations, DNA sequences or “definitions” cannot replace voucher specimens. The latter are and will be badly needed for the proper knowledge of the vanishing biodiversity of our planet. We review arguments pro and con the need to have a Rule in the Code requiring the deposition of onomatophores in collections for the proper and valid creation of new nomina in zoological nomenclature. In conclusion, we propose a more drastic Rule in this respect but also the possibility, in some exceptional cases, to apply to the International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature to make nomina available even in the absence of material onomatophores.

Various arguments and examples discussed throughout this paper impact directly on cryptozoology. Take, for instance, these two:

This case might be the most convincing one for the formal description of species without having actual specimens in hands. Ancient iconographic documents are sometimes used by some taxonomists to provide evidence that the specimens which were used to produce these illustrations belonged indeed in unknown, or at least undescribed and unnamed, zoological species. This may even in some extreme cases be possible using solely descriptions in words, without illustrations, when these descriptions are detailed enough, and apparently accurate enough, to warrant such conclusions.

A good example of this situation is the formal description and naming by Bour (1978) of a new tortoise from the Mascarene, based on illustrations published in 1737 that were precise enough to allow ascertaining the diagnostic characters of this species, which had become extinct around 1840 as a result of man’s exploita-tion (Bour 1984), and which was until then known only by imprecise descriptions of travellers. Interestingly, this description prompted the discovery of subfossil remains of the same species, which allowed a more complete redescription (Bour 1979), and later to show that this species was in fact the one that had been originally named Testudo indica Schneider, 1783 on the basis of a holotype, still extant, but which had been considered for two centuries of unknown origin (Arnold 1979, Austin et al. 2002). Such exceptional discoveries will no doubt remain possible in the future, and it certainly would not be appropriate to forbid the naming of such species because no specimen is available.

And..

As discussed below, a photograph by itself cannot be used as an objective proof of the existence of an animal, and a verbal description or a testimony, even if supported by several witnesses, cannot qualify as a scientific evidence, for several reasons spanning from observations that are inaccurate (although honest) due to various material reasons, to deliberate falsification or pure invention. Good examples of such problems are those posed by the various “mythical animals” that have been “seen”, sometimes by many “witnesses”, but for which material evidence is still missing, such as the abominable snowman and its avatars (yeti, migu, bar-manu, sasquatch, etc.), the Loch Ness monster and various “sea snakes” and other marine monsters. Most of these stories are purely verbal, but some “material documents” indeed exist, such as “photos” of the Loch Ness monster or of the sasquatch, or recordings of the voice of the Caucasian barmanu, which all have in comment to be of “bad quality” (photos out of focus, recordings with noisy background, etc.).

In a few cases, Latin nomina were indeed proposed for such “animals”, despite the absence of specimens, but on the basis of testimonies, descriptions, traces such as footprints, hair or “scalp”, or even photographs.

An interesting case is that of the “iceman” formally described and named Homo pongoides on the basis of a specimen purported to have been examined through ice in an itinerant circus, but which later “disappeared”, and for which several photographs and drawings were published (Heuvelmans 1969, Heuvelmans & Porchnev 1974). What can science do with such “descriptions” and nomina? How can the criterion of Article 1.3.1 for exclusion of “hypothetical concepts” be applied? Is the nomen Homo pongoides a hoplonym or an anoplo-nym, and, if it is a hoplonym, what is its status? Valid nomen, synonym, nomen dubium? If deposition of a specimen in a public collection was compulsory for availability of new nomina, such a question would not be raised, and formal description would have to await capture of a specimen or discovery of remains attributed to this “taxon”.

Indeed, for a bit more on the role of photographs and the naming of cryptids, there is this interesting passage:

There is no need to turn to deep-sea organisms to encounter problems with descriptions of new taxa based only on photographs. Examples of such problems, discussed by Pauwels & Meirte (1996) and Pauwels & Chérot (1997), include the description of the “Loch Ness monster” as Nessiteras rhombopteryx by Scott & Rines (1975), that of Cryptophidion annamense by Wallach & Jones (1992) and that of Cadborosaurus willsi by Bousfield & Leblond (1995). These cases, and several other ones, belong in the domain of “cryptozoology”, a pseudo-science created by Bernard Heuvelmans on the basis of a misunderstanding, because he thought that onomatophores were required by the Code for description of new zoological taxa (Pauwels & Chérot 1997): in fact, they were not then, but the problems created by such descriptions led many zoologists to hope that the fourth edition of the Code would require the designation of an onomatophore and its deposition in a collection for nomen availability. In the absence of such a Rule, it is formally impossible to exclude from zoological nomenclature some extreme cases of “hypothetical concepts” described as new taxa. Thus,the description by Quintart (1989), as Marsupilami franquini, of the marsupilami, an imaginary animal created in cartoons by Franquin, was recorded in the Zoological Record, and there is no reason why the Rhino-gradentia, imaginary organisms described with extravagant details by an imaginary professor (Stümpke 1962), should not be so!

I note the authors are behind in their cryptozoology readings. It is generally agreed today that Ivan T. Sanderson, not Heuvelmans, coined the word “cryptozoology.” And several people might be seen as being founders of the zoological subdivision we call “cryptozoology” today. Therefore, I would hardly say that this is a correct statement by the paper’s authors: ” ‘cryptozoology’, a pseudo-science created by Bernard Heuvelmans”!

To read the entire paper, see, below. It is a pdf. Please upload it by merely clicking:Cryptozoological Nomenclature

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